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CAFE standards have been in place since 1978. After the increase in petroleum 
prices in 1998-99, CAFE standards again arose as a public policy issue. This paper 
attempts to model the impact of higher CAFE standards on producer and consumer 
welfare, gasoline consumption, externalities from increased driving, and the emissions of 
traditional pollutants, given that CAFE standards are successful in inducing 
manufacturers to engage in technology forcing. The study then examines CAFE standards 
from a cost-benefit and a cost-effectiveness viewpoint.  
 
In particular, a long-run 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE standard would impose 
social welfare losses of $5.556 billion per year and save 5.1 billion gallons of gasoline 
per year. This amounts to a hidden tax of $1.09 per gallon conserved. An 11 cent per 
gallon increase in the gasoline tax would save the same amount of fuel at a welfare cost 
of $275 million per year. The 3.0 MPG increase is thus 20 times more expensive than the 
gas tax increase. The marginal welfare costs of long-term increases in the CAFE standard 
amount to $1.26 per gallon and exceed by a factor of five recent estimates of the marginal 
societal benefits from avoided externalities. Increasing the CAFE standard is therefore  
neither cost-effective nor cost-beneficial. 
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Impacts of Long-Range Increases in the  
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard 
 
Andrew N. Kleit 
 
I.  Introduction and Background 
 
  In 1975 the U.S. government enacted legislation regulating the fuel efficiency of 
new motor vehicles. The apparent objective of this law is to reduce American dependence 
on foreign oil. After large increases in the price of petroleum in the late 1990s, and with 
continued conflict in the Middle East, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards once again became a topic of interest.  A number of proposals for changing the 
CAFE standards were discussed in Congress in early 2002, culminating in a defeat in the 
U.S. Senate of an amendment that would have required a fifty percent increase in the 
relevant CAFE standards. In place of that increase, the Senate voted to require the 
executive branch to examine the impact of further increases in the CAFE standard.  
  This paper evaluates the “long-term” economic implications of raising the 
standard by 3.0 MPG above current levels. In industry parlance, this approach is 
sometimes referred to as “technology forcing.” I choose 3.0 MPG because it reflects the 
focus of a May 2001 report by the Vice President’s task force on energy policy and 
because it reflects several legislative proposals in Congress.
1 The long run refers to a 
length of time such that manufacturers can adjust vehicle technologies and powertrain 
designs to reduce the amount of fuel required to move a given amount of mass or to 
achieve a given amount of performance or acceleration per gallon of fuel consumed. 
Previous work on CAFE standards, such as Kleit (1990) and Thorpe (1996), focused on 
short-term responses to higher CAFE standards, where technology forcing was not an 
option for manufacturers. 
                                                 
1 See “National Energy Policy,” Report of the National Energy Policy Development 
Group (May 2001) http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/ at page 4-10.  
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The analysis is conducted under two different scenarios. The first scenario is that CAFE 
standards are not binding in the current marketplace. The second scenario takes 
account of the current impact of CAFE standards, and then analyzes the costs and 
benefits of increasing the standards. The costs of CAFE standards are broken down into 
two areas: the changes in consumer and producer surplus, and the increase in externalities 
caused by the increased driving that higher CAFE standards induce. 
The plan of this study is as follows. Section II reviews the history of CAFE 
standards and briefly discusses the rationale for the regulation. Section III develops a 
model in which the current CAFE standard is assumed to be non-binding. Section IV 
provides estimates of the impacts for a long-term 3.0 MPG gallon CAFE increase under 
the assumption that the current CAFE standard is not binding. Section V then revises the 
model to take into account the arguably more realistic assumption that the existing CAFE 
standard was in fact binding. It then reports estimates for a long-term 3.0 MPG increase. 
Section VI provides a brief cost-benefit analysis of CAFE increases, and Section VII 
provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
II.  Background on Automobile Fuel Economy Standards  
 
A.  A Brief History of the CAFE Program 
The CAFE program, as enacted in 1975, called for all manufacturers selling more 
than 10,000 autos per year in the U.S. to reach the mandated CAFE levels. CAFE levels 
rose from 19.0 MPG in 1978 to 27.5 MPG in 1985 and later years. A manufacturer’s 
domestic and foreign cars are placed in separate CAFE categories, based on the domestic 
context of the vehicle. If a car has over 75 percent American context, it is considered 
“domestic” and placed in the domestic “pool.”  Otherwise, it is placed in the foreign car 
pool. (See Kleit, 1990, for a discussion.) 
Light trucks (pickup trucks, sport-utility vehicles, and minivans) were placed in a 
different CAFE “pool” than cars. When CAFE standards were originally passed these 
vehicles represented a small fraction of the relevant market. By the year 2001, however, 
such vehicles made up approximately one-half of the sales of personal vehicles. By 2001,  
 
2
light trucks were required to reach 20.7 miles per gallon. (There is no domestic and 
foreign division in the CAFE regulation for light trucks.)  
  If a review process finds that a manufacturer has not met the CAFE standard, that 
manufacturer is subject to a civil fine. The level of that fine is now set equal to fifty-five 
dollars per car-MPG for each manufacturer. For example, if a manufacturer producers 
one million cars with an average MPG of 26.5 MPG when the CAFE standard equals 
27.5 MPG, that firm could be subject to a fine of $55*1,000,000*(27.5-26.5)= $55 
million. CAFE standards are calculated using harmonic averaging, as described below. 
  One important aspect of the impact of CAFE standards is that foreign firms 
appear to view the CAFE fine as a mere tax. Thus, several foreign firms, such as BMW 
and Mercedes-Benz, have routinely paid CAFE fines. In contrast, American firms have 
stated that they view CAFE standards as binding. Were they to violate the standards, 
American firms claim that they would therefore be liable for civil damages in stockholder 
suits. Even Chrysler, which is owned by Daimler-Benz, has made it clear it is unwilling 
to pay CAFE fines. CAFE standards thus impose a “shadow tax” equal to the value of the 
relevant Lagrange multiplier on constrained domestic producers. Since the shadow tax of 
the CAFE constraint can be far higher than $55 per car-MPG, this implies that CAFE 
standards are not terribly binding on foreign firms, and far more binding on U.S. firms. 
  As stated above, higher CAFE standards were defeated in the U.S. Senate in early 
2002. Proposals to raise the standards, however, continue to be evaluated in both the 
executive and legislative branch. In addition, in the summer of 2002 the state of 
California passed legislation limiting the average output (by firm) from new automobiles 
of carbon dioxide per mile. Since the current method of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions from vehicles is to raise fuel economy, California’s law is simply another form 




B.  If CAFE is the Answer, Exactly What is the Question? 
At the margin, consumers equate the price of gasoline (the “internal” cost) with 
the marginal value of its consumption. In the absence of any externality, the marginal 
value of the use of a gallon of gas equals its price, and there is no public benefit from 
reducing the consumption of gasoline. Where externalities exist, economic theory is clear 
that the optimal policy is to set a level of stringency at which the marginal benefit of 
consumption of a gallon of gasoline equals the marginal cost plus the level of the relevant 
externality. 
Thus, the question becomes one of determining what the relevant externality is. A 
recent report of the National Research Council attempted to quantify this externality.
2 
The NRC concluded that the “high level” externality associated with the consumption of 
a gallon of gasoline amounts to $0.26 per gallon. (For the purposes of this paper, I will 
assume this amount is both an average and a marginal benefit.) 
The NRC divides the estimate into three components: $0.12 cents per gallon for 
adverse global climate effects, $0.12 per gallon for oil import effects, and $0.02 for 
changes in other pollution emissions at the refining level. Each of these estimates is 
subject to criticism. For example, there is a wide range of uncertainty about measuring 
the relevant externality for climate change. Several previous estimates imply the climate 
change externality is between 1 and 4 cents a gallon, implying the NRC may have 
overestimated this externality by a factor of at least three. (See Toman and Shogren, 
2000.)  
The $0.12 per gallon estimate for oil import is also subject to criticism. First, this 
estimate ignores the benefits from specialization according to comparative advantage. 
Second, the estimate assumes that CAFE changes can have a material influence on 
worldwide energy supply and demand. Because the United States only has about 26 
percent of world oil consumption,
3 however, and there seems to be significant elasticity 
to the supply of oil, the U.S. does not appear to have any significant monopsony power in 
this market. Finally, it is unclear how reducing domestic consumption increases “oil 
                                                 
2 See National Research Council, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standards, July 2001, http://books.nap.edu/html/cafe/. 
3 See Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t24.txt  
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security.” Oil is traded in a world market, implying that it is difficult to insulate the U.S. 
from price shocks originating anywhere in the world. Reviewing such factors Bohi and 
Toman (1996) conclude that there is no discernible oil import or energy security 
premium, though this question is subject to serious debate.  
The NRC also allocates an externality of $0.02 cents per gallon for emissions of 
criteria pollutants from refiners. To the extent refiners are already under emission caps it 
is unclear what effect higher CAFE standards would have on refinery emissions.  CAFE 
standards, however, are not likely to reduce the emissions of “traditional” pollutants, 
volatile organic compounds, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide (NOx, VOC, and 
CO respectively) from automobiles at the street level. These traditional pollutants are 
regulated by the EPA on a per mile basis. Thus, CAFE does nothing to change the 
grams/mile emissions. However, if CAFE standards increase miles driven, via what is 
termed the “rebound effect,” they can be expected to increase emissions of traditional 
pollutants. (See Espey, 1997.) Indeed, the results below indicate that higher CAFE 
standards serve to increase the emissions of traditional pollutants. 
In addition, the gains to society from reducing the consumption of gasoline may 
be reduced or eliminated because gasoline is already a highly taxed good.
4 The question 
here becomes one of how much of those funds are recycled back into funds to build and 
support roadways, and therefore might better be viewed as user fees rather than attempts 
to combat externalities. 
Greene (1997) asserts that a further rationale for CAFE standards is that 
purchasers of automobiles cannot truly estimate the fuel costs of their vehicles. Nivola 
and Crandall (1995, 27) counter that fuel costs are prominently displayed for the 
consumer to read. Even if consumers do have trouble obtaining and processing this 
information, however, it is unclear why the level of fuel economy offered in the market 
should be biased either above or below the efficient level.   
 
 
                                                 




III.  Assumptions of the Model 
 
Many of the theoretical details of this model are similar to what I used in my 
previous work on the impact of CAFE standards in the short-run,
5 and I will not repeat 
that discussion here. The model begins with a set of supply and demand elasticities, and 
initial conditions in prices and quantities. It assumes that demand and supply curves are 
linear. It then imposes a set of implicit CAFE taxes on each constrained firm such that, in 
equilibrium, each constrained firm reaches the relevant CAFE standard. I begin the 
analysis under the assumption that CAFE is not currently binding. 
 
A.  Base year and categories. 
Given the availability of data, model year (MY) 1999 was chosen as the base year. 
(All dollar figures therefore are in 1999 dollars.) Light vehicles were broken down into 
eleven categories: Cars are broken into five categories; 1) Small; 2) Mid-size; 3) Large; 
4) Sports; and 5) Luxury. Trucks are broken down into; 6) Small pickups; 7) Large 
pickups; 8) Small SUVs; 9) Large SUVs; 10) Minivans; and 11) Vans. 
For convenience, the data are broken down into four firms, General Motors (GM), 
Ford, Daimler-Chrysler (domestic production), and “Other.” The “other” firms consist of 
several foreign concerns, such as BMW, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, and Toyota. The 
relevant numbers, and the MPGs for each firm/category, are presented in table 1. 
Transaction prices are generated by taking the average price for each category in 
the GM model supplied to me by GM economists. Data on MPGs was also supplied to 
me by GM. 
 
B. Demand  Side 
Elasticities and cross-elasticities between categories are calculated using the 
internal GM demand model supplied to me. The GM model starts by using conjoint 
analysis (similar to, for example, Roe et. al. (1996)) of different vehicle attributes, based 
on the responses of about 4,000 “clinic” participants. These results are combined with 
estimates from market data and other clinics of the interactions between new and used 
                                                 
5 See Kleit (1990). For a similar model, see Thorpe (1997).  
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vehicles in different segments to estimate the own-price elasticity for each nameplate. 
Thus, one of the outputs of the model is an estimate of the change in sales for each 
vehicle nameplate (e.g., Chevrolet Cavalier) as its price changes.  
This information is, in turn, combined with survey data on the second choices of 
about 90,000 new vehicle buyers from all manufacturers to estimate the cross-elasticities 
among nameplates, in a method similar to Bordley (1993).  These results are then 
aggregated into own- and cross-price elasticities for all vehicles in a given market 
segment. The estimates are updated every year. 
The model given to me starts with base quantities and prices for MY 1999. In 
response to a new vector of auto prices, it will calculate a new vector of quantities sold. I 
therefore calculate elasticities and cross elasticities by raising the price of all vehicles in a 
particular category by one percent, and determining the resulting percentage change in 
demand, not only in that category, but for all other categories as well. Because 10.0 
percent of cars are placed in a category designated as “Other” in the GM model, all 
elasticities are multiplied by 0.90. The calculated elasticities are presented in table 12. 
 
C. Supply  Side 
Consistent with my previous work, I assume that the supply side is competitive, 
with an elasticity of supply in the short run of 2.
6 In the longer-run, supply is generally 
more elastic; as firms have a longer time to adjust to new conditions. Therefore, for the 
long-run model, I assume an elasticity of supply of 4. Because CAFE standards divide 
cars into domestic and foreign fleets, this essentially implies for the purpose of this model 
that (Daimler) Chrysler is two firms, one domestic, and one foreign. 
  A competitive model is used for two reasons. First, the market is becoming more 
competitive over time. For example, in 1999 the “Big 3” American firms had less than 50 
percent of the small car market. While the truck market in 1999 was apparently less 
competitive, all indications are that Asian firms will be entering these segments 
aggressively. Second, in the context of the 1999 market, where firms own both domestic 
                                                 
6 Below I will attempt to account for the likelihood that CAFE standards were already 
binding by running the model “backwards” using short-run elasticities of supply, and 
then “forwards” using the long-run elasticity of supply.  
 
7
and “foreign” production under the CAFE law, creating an Cournot-Nash equilibrium is 
more difficult. A Cournot equilibrium in this case is usually calculated by assuming that 
each firm has a fixed marginal cost, and solving backwards. In this case, however, that is 
unrealistic. Ford, for example, produces both Lincoln Continentals (domestic) and 
Jaguars (foreign). With the typical Cournot assumption, and CAFE shadow taxes on 
Lincolns, Ford would simply shift all production out of Lincolns into Jaguars.  
  The differences between the results assuming a competitive model and using an 
oligopolistic model depend on the relative demand elasticities between larger and smaller 
cars. (See Kleit, 1990 at 166-170.) CAFE shadow taxes result in an increase in small car 
production and a decrease in large car production. When the demand for large cars is 
more elastic than the demand for small cars, this can serve to reduce or even eliminate the 
deadweight loss associated with CAFE standards. The reason for this is that in such a 
market, relative to the production of large cars, there are too few small cars produced. In 
the demand structure for this paper, however, the demand for large vehicles is generally 
less elastic than the demand for small vehicles.
7 
 
D.  Treatment of Foreign Firms 
As discussed in Section II, CAFE standards call for a fine of $55 per car-MPG to 
be assessed to firms that do not meet the standard. Domestic firms have always asserted 
that, for corporate policy and legal reasons, paying a fine is not an option. Therefore, the 
standard is modeled as binding on them. Foreign firms, however, appear to view the fine 
as equivalent to a tax. Several foreign firms with relatively small volumes, over the years, 
have paid this tax to the Federal government. The larger foreign firms, however, have 
traditionally sold a mix of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicle mixes and have not been 




                                                 
7 There are some caveats to this, as a review of Table 12 will make apparent. The own 
demand for medium and large cars is relatively elastic, but this is due to the high cross- 
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E.  The Technology Forcing Model 
In my previous work (Kleit 1990), I assumed that manufacturers could not change 
the technology of their vehicles. This was done because the time period in question was 
“short-run,” where technology innovation could not reach the market in time. In such 
circumstances, manufacturers must “mix-shift,” sell fewer large cars and more small cars, 
in order to meet CAFE standards.  
The circumstances evaluated here, however, relate to the “long-run.” In this case, 
firms can meet higher CAFE standards by either mix-shifting or improving their fuel-
efficiency technology. Therefore, in this section I present a model of “technology 
forcing,” where firms increase the fuel efficiency of particular vehicles in response to 
CAFE standards.
8 
According to the method by which the statute defines a firm’s average mile per 
gallon, a firm that does not meet the CAFE standard has total CAFE fine equal to: 
 





   
 
   S −  MPG ()  ,  S>MPG,  
 
where  λ  is the shadow cost of compliance, S is the CAFE standard, and Qi is the 
quantity of each model type i sold by the firm. Under the CAFE standard, a firm’s MPG 
is defined as a harmonic average, 
 








where MPGi is the mileage for each type of car sold by the relevant firm. 
In this model, the firm faces total cost: 
                                                                                                                                                 
elasticity of demand between the two segments. In addition, the own elasticity of demand 
for vans is very similar to the own demand elasticity for mini-vans.  
8 I note that my use of the phrase “technology forcing” may be slightly different than that 
generally used in the environmental literature. Here by “technology forcing” I refer to 
manufacturers using technologies that they would otherwise not find profitable, rather 




(3) TC  =  C i ∑ Qi, MPGi ()  +  F . 
 
where Ci represents the costs of one model and i is an index of models. Here the cost for 
MPGi is net of consumer demand for MPG. Thus, I assume that a firm will invest in fuel 
efficiency in a world without CAFE standards as long as the firm finds it profitable to do 
so, that is, consumers are willing to pay for fuel economy increases. Under this 
assumption, the free market net
9 marginal cost of fuel economy is 0, as the marginal cost 
of fuel economy will equal the marginal  
return of fuel economy to the consumer. 
I define the cost function for any vehicle type i as: 
 
(4)   TCi = Ci(Qi) +QiDi(MPGi), 
 
where Di represents the cost of fuel economy. Note that here and in following references 
Di refers to the net cost of fuel economy. Below I will discuss how the marginal cost of 
fuel economy relates to the CAFE standard.  Inserting the impact of fuel economy 
standards, total cost becomes: 









   
 
    S −  Q 1
i=1
T
∑ Qi MPGi () ∑
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
    
 
Minimizing total (net) costs with respect to MPGi yields: 
 
(6)  dTC dMPGi  =  Q i dDi dMPGi ()  −  λMPG
2 Qi MPGi
2   =  O. 
 
                                                 
9 All of the costs of fuel efficiency used in this section, and applied to subsequent 
sections, refer to net costs, that is, the costs of fuel efficiency minus the benefits. The 
benefits are, of course, the reduced per mile cost of driving. Thus, these represent 
economic rather than engineering costs.  
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If the constraint is binding, MPG=S, and: 
 




This defines the level of technology forcing undergone by the firm. 
Given this and MPGi, a firm has marginal cost of production in type i of:  
 
(8) 
dTC dQi  =  dC dQi +  Di MPGi ( ) +  λ S −  MPG ( ) [  −  Q i ∑ 1 MPGi () ∑ ( (
−  Q i Qi MPGi () ∑ () ∑
2 () 1 MPGi () )] 
 
=  dC dQi  +  D i MPGi ()  +  λ S –  2MPG +  MPG
2 MPGi ( ) [ ] 
 
In equilibrium, S =  MPG, which implies:  
 
(9) dTC dQi  =  dC dQi +  Di MPGi ( ) +  λS S MPGi ( )−1 ( ) . 
 
This equation defines the “CAFE induced” marginal cost of production, which is set 
equal to price in the model below. It also implies that an important element of the model 
is an estimate of λ, the shadow CAFE tax. 
It is necessary to employ empirical estimates for the Di function, which represents 
the cost of fuel economy to vehicle producers. The 1999 Sierra Research report
10 is used 
for this purpose. The Sierra report estimates the cost of additional fuel economy 
improvements in the year 2010. The report has a series of estimates of how much money 
– in excess of returns to the consumer – would be required to increase fuel economy to a 
                                                 
10 See http://www.tc.gc.ca/envaffairs/subgroups1/vehicle%5Ftechnology%5Fold 
/study2/Final_report/Final_Report.htm. The Sierra Research report relies on estimates of 
the costs and fuel economy benefits of different technologies based on confidential data 
supplied by different original equipment manufacturers and suppliers, from technical 
papers, and the engineering expertise of Sierra Research employees. At current U.S. 
gasoline prices, Sierra estimated that nearly all technologies that would be available by  
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certain level. Thus, it estimates the required numbers for this model – the cost to 
consumers net of the benefits. The NRC study provides no such numbers. Initially, for 
both cars and trucks, I estimated a function: 
 
(10) dDi/dMPG = a∆MPG + b(∆MPG)
2, 
where  ∆MPG equals the change in MPG above the unconstrained market level. I 
expected both coefficients a and b to be positive. Consistent with the discussion above, in 
this model, D=0 at the MY 1999 equilibrium level (∆MPG=0), making the assumption 
that at this point CAFE standards were “just non-binding.” Without binding CAFE 
standards, firms should invest in fuel economy up to the point where consumers are 
willing to pay for it. In both car and truck estimates, however, the coefficient b was 
slightly negative and insignificant. I therefore re-estimated the equations, setting the 
relevant b’s to 0. I obtained an a=24.0 for cars and 65.6 for trucks. This implies (by 
integration) the total cost of increasing fuel economy (net of the benefits to consumers) is 
12 (∆MPG)
2 for cars and 32.8 (∆MPG)
2 for trucks. 
  It should be noted that the long-term model implicitly assumes that the vehicle 
manufacturers have perfect foresight with respect to the demand for fuel economy several 
years into the future. With this perfect foresight, firms can reach all of the CAFE 
mandated increases in fuel economy through technology forcing, without the need to 
resort to far more expensive short-run mix-shifting. Given the uncertainties inherent in 
the market for energy, which is crucial to the demand for fuel economy, the perfect 
foresight assumption would appear to result in a conservative estimate of the long-run 
cost of CAFE standards.  (See Kleit, 1992.) 
 
F.  The Gasoline Consumption Model 
Once the relevant market equilibrium has been calculated, the impact of that 
market equilibrium on gasoline consumption must be estimated. Two important factors 
must be considered here. First, CAFE standards put some or most new car buyers in more 
fuel-efficient vehicles. This lowers their marginal cost of driving, and causes them to 
                                                                                                                                                 
2010 would cost consumers more than the discounted value of future fuel savings and 
would, therefore, increase the cost of transportation to consumers.  
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drive more, a phenomenon that is referred to as the “rebound effect.” A recent study 
(Greene et al, 1999), whose results I employ, finds that for every 10 percent that fuel 
economy is increased, driving increases 2 percent. 
In addition, several studies imply that changing conditions in the new car market 
changes the actions of market participants in the used car market. Higher prices in new 
car markets makes used cars more attractive, reducing the scrappage rates of such cars. 
Here I adopt the empirical estimates I used in my 1990 article. (Since these estimates are 
in percentage terms, they are not obviously affected by the improvements in automobile 
durability.) As in my previous work, a (real) discount rate of 4 percent is used. 
 
G. Pollution  Impacts 
To model pollution emissions, one must know the emissions per mile by model 
year and vintage. The difficulty here is that while regulators set the standards at one level, 
emissions over time are generally larger as on-board emission systems deteriorate and 
automobile users fail to maintain and repair them. Data on emission rates by model year 
and vintage were obtained from Air Improvement Resources, Inc. 
Unlike the rest of the model, I use year 2004 pollution characteristics for the base 
year, and years 1990-2003 for the stockage years. This is because these levels are set by 
government regulation, and we can have some confidence at this point in time that this 
will be the actual emissions from MY 2004 and later vehicles.  
 
IV.  Results of the Model Where the Current CAFE Standard is Non-Binding 
 
Table 2 begins the presentation of the results of raising the CAFE standard by 3.0 
MPG for a one year period far enough in the future so that it can be considered “long-
run.” Shadow taxes on cars range from $66 to $70 per MPG, while taxes on trucks, where 
technology increases are more expensive, range from $181 to $184 per MPG. Since all 
three firms meet the standards in large part by technology forcing, and are assumed to 
have the same technology available to them, all three have similar shadow tax values.  
Welfare effects are presented in table 3. U.S. manufacturers between them would 
lose about $633 million, while U.S. consumers would lose approximately $1.596 billion.  
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(Consumer welfare losses are calculated along the lines of Braeutigam and Noll, 1984.) 
Total losses to producers and consumers therefore amount to $2.2 billion.    
It is also necessary to calculate the increase in externalities caused by higher 
CAFE standards. CAFE standards lead to more miles driven, which leads to increased 
accidents and congestion. Edlin (1999 at 4) estimates that accidents cost about 8 cents per 
additional mile driven. Winston and Shirley (1998 at 64) present a higher estimate—
about 20 cents per mile.
11 Lutter finds that the average congestion cost per mile of vehicle 
use is about 2.4 cents per mile. This is likely a conservative estimate of the congestion 
cost of extra driving, as the marginal cost of congestion is expected to be higher than the 
average cost.
12 Here I will use the more conservative figures, with an externality per mile 
of 10.4 cents (the Edlin estimate for accidents plus the Lutter estimate for congestion.) 
In contrast, the economic value of the increases in pollution are relatively small. 
The federal Office of Management and Budget values VOCs at approximately $0.51 to 
$2.36 per kilogram, and Nitrogen Oxides at the same level. Carbon monoxide, at least 
according to OMB, appears to have no marginal cost impact on the economy.
13 For 
purposes of this paper, I choose an externality cost of $1.43 per kilogram for both VOC 
and NOx. 
As table 4 indicates, miles driven increase 25.650 billion, or 1.48 percent of MY 
1999 fleet levels. Pollution impacts are also presented in table 4. Emissions of all three 
traditional pollutants rise between 1.64 and 1.84 percent. This increase is due in large part 
to the rebound effect, which causes more driving and more pollution.  
The net externality cost of higher CAFE standards, using the estimates presented 
in the two paragraphs above, is $2.641 billion. As table 4 indicates, almost 99 percent of 
the increased externality costs come from accidents and congestion.  
                                                 
11 I note that both the Edlin and the Winston and Shirly estimates are taken from the fact 
that drivers do not pay insurance on a per mile basis. If, on the other hand, one modeled 
the decision to drive as including the probability of an accident and the resulting higher 
insurance costs, these figures might be lower. 
12 This is the average cost calculated as the cost of congestion-related delays and fuel 
costs, $78 billion, divided by aggregate VMT by light duty vehicles.  See Lutter, Randall, 
“CAFE: The Numbers Behind the Story” March 2002 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=84 
13 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf  
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In this model, gasoline consumption declines by 5.242 billion gallons or 7.21 
percent of total fleet consumption. The model does not explicitly generate a marginal cost 
per gallon saved. To generate such a figure, I ran the model 30 times, for MPG increases 
of 0.10 MPG at a time, for MPG increases ranging from 1.1 MPG to 4.0 MPG. I then ran 
a regression of total cost on gallons saved, gallons saved squared, and gallons saved 
cubed (costs in billion dollars, gallons saved in billions). The results of this regression are 
reported in table 6. Taking the relevant derivatives, and solving for the amount of 
gasoline saved with a CAFE increase of 3.0 MPG yields a marginal cost per gallon saved 
of $0.92 when only producer and consumer effects are considered. The total marginal 
cost, including externalities, is $1.26.  
All of the results of Sections III and IV assume the current CAFE standard is not 
binding at today’s standard, but would be binding for any increases. The NRC study, 
cited above, however, concludes that the existing standards are, in fact, binding and this 
is consistent with my discussions with industry engineers and economists. I next turn to 
the case of binding current constraints. 
 
V. The Effect of Raising CAFE Standards Assuming the Standards are Already 
Binding  
 
It is conceptually possible to calculate the impact of increasing CAFE standards 
given that they are already binding. This is an important consideration. It is a well-known 
result of public finance economics that the losses due to taxation are a function of the 
taxes squared, rather than simply a linear function of the taxes. If CAFE standards were 
already binding in MY 1999, it implies that the approach used above underestimates the 
true loss to the economy of raising CAFE standards. Part A of this section outlines the 
several step process for estimating this loss. Part B applies the methodology of Part A to 
this market. 
A.  Modeling the Existing CAFE Shadow Tax 
To make the estimation of the losses to increasing an already-binding CAFE 
standard, I take the following steps.  First, I assume that U.S. firms in MY 1999 engaged 
in mix-shifting, but not technology forcing as a result of CAFE standards. Second, I  
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obtained input ratios by car type for General Motors (GM) cars (with a Chevrolet Malibu 
having an input ratio of 1.0). I assume that the marginal costs of production for cars are a 
linear function of these input ratios. Third, I assumed that marketing and other costs 
(including goodwill) constitute a constant fraction R of marginal costs. (Recall that 
because a competitive model is being used here, price equals (total) marginal cost.) In 
this context, assume that the shadow CAFE tax per MPG on vehicles is L.  Also assume 
that the PT equals the pass-through rate, the rate at which changes in taxes are passed 
through to the final consumer. This implies the equation: 
 
(11)    (1+R)MCi + PT*L (S((S/MPGi)-1)) = Pi, 
 
where Pi equals price of car i, MCi equals marginal cost of car i, S is the implicit CAFE 
standard (here it would be the fleet MPG that actually occurred in MY 1999), MPGi is the 
miles per gallon achieved by car i, and L(S(S/MPGi)-1) is the formula for per-car MPG, 
derived from CAFE harmonic averaging. Because I only have data on GM models (and 
only sufficient data on GM car models) I estimate the value of L using least squares 
across GM car models. 
Fourth, the implicit tax L calculated here applies directly only to GM cars. I 
assumed that Ford and Chrysler have similar CAFE taxes on their cars. Since they 
currently have CAFE levels roughly equivalent to GM’s, their implicit taxes may be 
similar to GM’s.  (In fact, Ford and Chrysler had slightly lower fleet MPGs than GM in 
MY 1999.) I also assume that the CAFE tax on trucks is equal to the tax on cars. Because 
there is substantial evidence that U.S. manufacturers have had more difficulty reaching 
their CAFE standards for trucks rather than cars, this assumption serves to underestimate 
the relevant loss to society.  
Fifth, given an estimated CAFE shadow tax L, I ran the 1999 model (the one 
presented above) “backwards,” setting the CAFE tax at –L, generating a new equilibrium 
in prices and quantities. 
Sixth, the supply curves calculated for the initial model will have the relevant 




At this point I have a new “initial” no-CAFE or free market equilibrium with 
demand and supply curves. The model can then be run for firms to reach a particular 
CAFE standard. Changes in welfare from this equilibrium to the higher CAFE standard 
equilibrium can then be calculated. 
An additional problem comes from the multi-product nature of the market. This 
implies that taxes on one type of vehicle will impact prices of other types of vehicle. 
Given this, it takes some work through manipulation of supply and demand matrices to 
determine the pass-through rates for each type of vehicles. This work is available upon 
request from the author. 
For the model of this report, the results of the impact of a CAFE tax by vehicle 
type for GM cars are presented in table 7. For every dollar of CAFE shadow tax, dP/dt 
represents the pass-through rate for GM. For example, every dollar of CAFE tax reduces 
the price of small cars by about $0.84, and increases the price of luxury cars by about 
$0.88. 
  Table 8 presents the estimation results for the level of the CAFE tax in MY 1999. 
The dependent variable is the price in thousand dollars of GM cars. The two independent 
variables are the input ratios and the coefficient on the CAFE tax, as deduced in table 7. 
The model is run with and without a constant term. However, the estimated constant term 
in Model One has a very low t-statistic. Model Two, which is run without a constant, has 
large t-statistics and a high R-square (0.950). The estimated shadow tax from this 
estimation is $1652/MPG, and this is the level used in the simulations of Part C below.
14  
 
                                                 
14 The resulting changes in MPG because of this negative tax of $1652 per MPG are  
-1.05, -1.42, and –0.55 MPG for GM, Ford, and Chrysler cars, and –0.59, -0.50, and  
–0.40 MPG for GM, Ford, and Chrysler trucks.  
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B. Welfare Implications of Raising CAFE Standards Given that Standards 
      are Already Binding 
Tables 9 and 10 present the welfare changes as a result of raising the long-run 
CAFE standard 3.0 MPG above the 1999 level, again assuming a short-run tax of $1652 
was binding in MY 1999. As expected, the harm to the economy is greater than that in 
the previous long-term model.  
Total producer and consumer welfare losses to society from the MY 1999 
equilibrium of raising the long-run CAFE standard 3.0 MPG are $2.965 billion. Miles 
driven rise 1.88 percent from the MY 1999 equilibrium. Emissions of VOCs, NOx, and, 
carbon monoxide rise between 1.64 to 1.86 percent from the MY 1999 equilibrium. Total 
externality costs are $2.591 billion. Consumption of gasoline is reduced 5.1 billion 
gallons or 7.14 percent from the MY 1999 equilibrium.  The average cost of reducing a 
gasoline externality is $0.58 from the MY 1999 equilibrium including only producer and 
consumer welfare terms. Including externalities, the average cost of reducing a gasoline 
externality is $1.16. 
Total U.S. producer and consumer losses from the no-CAFE equilibrium of 
raising the long-run CAFE standard 3.0 MPG are $3.026 billion. Miles driven rise 1.93 
percent from the MY 1999 equilibrium. Emissions of VOCs, NOx, and, carbon monoxide 
rise from 2.07 to 2.25 percent from the no-CAFE equilibrium. The total cost of CAFE 
related externalities is $6.428 billion. Gasoline consumption falls 6.4 billion gallons, or 
9.82 percent from the no-CAFE equilibrium. The average cost of reducing a gasoline 
externality from the no-CAFE equilibrium is $0.47 including only producer and 
consumer welfare losses, and $1.00 when including all losses.  
Similar to before, I use the results of table 11 to estimate the marginal cost of 
saving a gallon of gasoline. I generate 30 data points, increasing the required fuel 
economy 0.1 MPG each time. I then regress gallons saved, linear, quadratic, and cubic 
terms on total cost. I then can estimate the derivative of total cost with respect to gallon 
saved. Given this, and the coefficients in table 11, the marginal cost of reducing a 
gasoline consumption externality is $1.06 in producer and consumer welfare terms, and 




VI.  Cost Effectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
This section asks two questions. First, do the benefits of CAFE standards exceed 
the costs? For benefits, I will use the NRC figure of $0.26 per gallon of externality.
15 
Second, are CAFE standards cost-effective? In this context, this means comparing the 
cost of CAFE standards to the cost of a gasoline tax that would generate equivalent 
gasoline savings.  
The discussion above indicates the impact of a CAFE increase of 3.0 MPG. For 
cost-effectiveness measures, I need to know the level of the tax that would generate 
equivalent gasoline savings. Pindyck (1979) indicates that the elasticity of demand for 
gasoline over a five year period is approximately 0.49, a number that is roughly half way 
between short-run and long-run estimates by Dahl and Sterner (1991). I will also assume 
a base gasoline consumption in the U.S. of 120 billion gallons at an initial price of $1.25 
per gallon, and that the demand curve for gasoline is linear in shape. Using these 
assumptions, it is straightforward to determine the gasoline tax needed to reach the 
desired level of gasoline savings. 
Economic theory indicates under these assumptions that the total loss to society 
from such a tax equals one-half the tax times the reduction in the number of gallons of 
gasoline consumption, while the marginal loss equals the level of the relevant tax.
16 Thus, 
the comparison here is between the gasoline savings of a one year CAFE standard 
increase of 3.0 MPG announced credibly several years in advance so that new 
technologies could be introduced, and an increase in the gasoline tax years in advance 
that has long-run impacts in the same year as the hypothetical CAFE standard increase. 
Assuming that CAFE standards were not binding in 1999, an increase in the 
CAFE standard of 3.0 MPG decreased gasoline consumption by 5.242 billion gallons, for 
an average cost per gallon of $0.93. This is more than three times the $0.26 per gallon 
benefit estimated by the NRC. 
                                                 
15 Note that in performing a cost-benefit analysis of CAFE standards, the price of 
gasoline will equal the marginal benefit of consumption. Thus, the value of the 
externality associated with the consumption of gasoline will constitute the net benefit to 
society from reductions in gasoline consumption.  
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Using estimates for the long-run elasticity of gasoline demand, a tax of $0.111 per 
gallon would be required to induce savings of 5.242 billion gallons of gasoline. Thus, a 
tax would impose an average cost on society of half of that amount, or $0.0555 per 
gallon. In other words, the 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE mandate would cost society 
16.8 times more than a gasoline tax increase saving the same amount of fuel.  At the 
margin, saving a gallon of gasoline costs the economy $1.26 in this scenario, far higher 
than the $0.26 benefit estimated by the NRC. 
Perhaps the more appropriate scenario is the one that compares a mandated CAFE 
increase to a binding CAFE constraint in 1999. In that scenario, gasoline consumption 
falls by 5.091 billion gallons per year, for an average cost of $1.16 per gallon. This is 
more than four times the NRC estimated benefits. 
This same reduction in gasoline consumption could be achieved by a gasoline tax 
increase of $0.108 cents per gallon. The gasoline tax would impose social costs of $275 
million, compared to $5.556 billion from higher CAFE standards. Thus, the 3.0 MPG 
increase in the CAFE mandate would cost society 20 times more than a gasoline tax 
increase saving the same amount of fuel. 
In this scenario, where CAFE standards are already considered to be binding, the 
marginal cost of mandating the long-run 3.0 MPG CAFE increase is $1.43 per gallon. 




Increases in CAFE standards above current levels are neither cost-effective nor 
cost-beneficial. Assuming that current CAFE standards are already binding, in the long 
run, increasing the CAFE standard by more than 3.0 MPG would impose additional costs 
of $5.556 billion per year and reduce gasoline consumption by 5.091 billion gallons per 
year. This amounts almost 20 times the cost of a gas tax increase that would save the 
same amount of fuel. The long-term marginal costs of the 3.0 MPG mandate would 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 I note that I do not subtract from the cost of a gasoline tax the economic impact on 
accidents and congestion resulting from the decrease in miles driven.  
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exceed the additional benefits of avoided gasoline consumption externalities by a factor 
of over five to one. 
CAFE standards suffer from a wealth of difficulties. They discriminate against 
American production, they encourage people to drive more, and retain their used vehicles 
longer, increase automobile accidents and congestion, the emissions of several pollutants, 
and they have the potential for serious consumer injury. If policy-makers desire to reduce 
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Initial Conditions – Prices and Quantities 
Model Year 1999 
 
Initial Totals by Class   
Prices Quantity   
Initial Quantities by Firms 
(millions of units)   
Class  ($000) (million) MPG    GM Ford  Chrys.  Forgn. 
1  14.336 2.057  33.53    0.589 0.313 0.096 1.059 
2  18.508 2.921  27.26    1.255 0.640 0.395 0.631 
3  21.710 1.840  26.86    0.267 0.363 0.243 0.968 
4  21.607 0.506  26.03    0.104 0.214 0.004 0.184 
5  30.365 1.102  24.44    0.240 0.117 0.000 0.746 
6  17.345 0.970  22.68    0.223 0.400 0.134 0.213 
7  23.424 1.455  18.83    0.576 0.513 0.356 0.000 
8  26.284 1.169  20.24    0.323 0.320 0.154 0.372 
9  31.296 1.459  18.30    0.390 0.304 0.486 0.279 
10  25.157 0.964  23.49    0.184 0.255 0.387 0.207 






Initial MPG by Firms 
(miles per gallon)  Class 
GM Ford    Chrys.  Forgn. 
1  32.52 33.61 31.92  34.26 
2  27.15 26.15 27.29  28.71 
3  26.05 24.65 25.46  28.46 
4  24.84 26.10 22.62  26.75 
5  23.80 22.78 -  24.94 
6  24.56 22.61 19.25  23.59 
7  19.34 18.43 17.60  - 
8  21.36 19.78 20.85  23.17 
9  16.91 16.36 18.53  20.20 
10  23.72 22.44 23.70  24.46 




Price and Output Effects of CAFE Increase of 
3.0 MPG For Both Cars and Trucks 
 
Totals by Class  Change from Initial 
Prices Quantity  Prices Quantity 
Class  ($000)  (million)  ($000)  (million) 
1  14.279 2.584  -0.057 0.027 
2  18.568 2.893  -0.060 -0.028 
3  21.783  1.827 0.073 -0.013 
4  21.706  0.503 0.099 -0.003 
5  30.496  1.102 0.131 0.000 
6  17.292 0.990  -0.053 0.020 
7  23.798  1.421 0.374 -0.034 
8  26.389  1.172 0.105 0.003 
9  31.746  1.429 0.450 -0.030 
10  25.024 0.982  -0.133 0.018 
11  20.896  0.347 0.285 0.011 
 
 
Output by Firms  Change of Output by Firms 
(millions of units)  (millions of units) 
Class  GM  Ford   Chrys.  Forgn.     GM Ford  Chrys.  Forgn. 
1  0.610  0.333 0.099 1.042   0.021 0.020 0.003 -0.017 
2  1.233  0.629 0.392 0.640   -0.022 -0.011 -0.003 0.008 
3  0.260  0.351 0.235 0.981   -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 0.013 
4  0.100  0.212 0.003 0.187   -0.004 -0.002 0.000  0.003 
5  0.231  0.113 0.000 0.759   -0.009 -0.004 0.000  0.013 
6  0.242  0.417 0.121 0.210   0.019 0.016 -0.013  -0.003 
7  0.572  0.503 0.337 0.000   -0.004 0.010  -0.020 0.000 
8  0.326  0.314 0.155 0.378   -0.003 -0.006 0.001  0.006 
9  0.366  0.285 0.483 0.295   -0.024 -0.019 -0.003 0.016 
10  0.190  0.258 0.402 0.203   0.005 0.003 0.015 -0.004 





Producer and Consumer Welfare Impacts of CAFE Increase  
of 3.0 MPG for Cars and Trucks 
 































The Impact of Standards on Pollution Emissions 
 
  Pollution Impacts 




VOC NOX  CO 
Original 
MY Level  
1,733,070 




MY Level  




877 million  1.167  1.33  17.931 
Total 
Change  25,650 million  10.474  8.720  97.228 
Percent 
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Regression Results to Estimate Marginal Cost of Gasoline Savings 
 





















  Number of Obs: 
30 R-square:0.963 





Pass-Through Rates by Car Type 
 
Type – Description  MPG  dP/dt 
1- small car  32.52 -0.839 
2 – midsize car  27.15 0.040 
3 – large car  26.05 0.228 
4 – sports car  24.84 0.783 
5 – luxury car  23.80 0.876 
6 – small truck  24.56 -1.168 
7 – large truck  19.34 0.246 
8 – small suv  21.36 -0.300 
9 - large suv  16.91 1.171 
10 – minivan  23.71 -1.253 







Estimating the 1999 CAFE tax 
(T-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
  Model One  Model Two 
Constant  0.725 
(0.39) 
 








R-square  0.951 0.950 





Welfare Effects - 3.0 MPG Increase 
CAFE Already Binding Model 
 
  Change from MY 1999 
Equilibrium 
Change from No-CAFE 
Equilibrium 
Changes in Producer 
Surplus ($ billion) 
   
General Motors 
  -0.433 -0.470 
Ford 
  -0.455 -0.501 
Chrysler 
  -0.236 -0.244 
Foreign Firms 
  0.260 0.213 
U.S. Firms Total 
  -1.124 -1.215 
Change in Consumer 
Surplus ($ billion)  -1.841 -1.811 
Change in U.S. Total 





Externality and Gasoline Consumption Effects - 3.0 MPG Increase 
CAFE Already Binding Model 
 
  Change from MY 1999 
Equilibrium 
Change from No-CAFE 
Equilibrium 
% Change  
in VOC Emissions   1.64% 2.07% 
% Change  
in NOx Emissions  1.80% 2.21% 
% Change  
in CO Emissions  1.86% 2.25% 







% Change in Miles Driven  1.88% 1.93% 
Total Externality Costs  
($ billion)  $2.591 $3.402 
Total Costs ($ billion)  $5.556 $6.428 
Average cost of reducing 
Gasoline Externality W/o 
and with externalities 
$0.58/$1.16 $0.47/$1.00 
Marginal cost of reducing 
Gasoline Externality 





Regression Results to Estimate Marginal Cost of Gasoline Savings 
CAFE Already Binding Model 
 





















  Number of Obs: 30 
R-square: 0.997 





Initial Conditions – Demand Elasticities 
 
Parameters Used in CAFE Simulation 
Demand Elasticity Table  Class 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 
 (1) Small Car  -2.808  0.423 0.063 0.018 0.000 0.036 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.000 
 (2) Medium Car 0.684 -3.528  1.107 0.027 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.036 0.045 0.054 0.009 
 (3) Large Cars  0.270 1.926 -4.500  0.027 0.216 0.009 0.054 0.018 0.063 0.054 0.009 
 (4) Sport Car  0.549 0.423 0.324 -2.250  0.009 0.090 0.198 0.045 0.108 0.018 0.000 
 (5) Luxury Car  0.045 0.405 1.062 0.009 -1.737  0.000 0.027 0.045 0.189 0.072 0.009 
 (6) Small Truck  0.162 0.099 0.000 0.009 0.000 -2.988  0.702 0.045 0.054 0.009 0.009 
 (7) Large Truck 0.063 0.072 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.234 -1.548  0.027 0.090 0.018 0.036 
 (8) Small SUV  0.216 0.279 0.099 0.027 0.009 0.090 0.351 -3.645  0.747 0.108 0.072 
 (9) Large SUV  0.117 0.243 0.171 0.018 0.018 0.054 0.387 0.414 -2.043  0.234 0.108 
 (10) Minivan  0.081 0.171 0.063 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.045 0.027 0.135 -2.286  0.180 
 (11) Van  0.027 0.036 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.054 0.036 0.072 0.387 -2.385 
 